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                             Abstract 
From the 'Socratic dialogues' to present day politics, the word dialogue has served many purposes 
and accommodated a plurality of meanings. My aim in this paper is both to assess the use of dialogue 
in two diverse but related fields - missionary activity and anthropological enquiry - and to re-propose 
its ethical standing, which goes beyond its validity as an analytical tool. Our case study for reflection 
is an ethnographic research conducted among the Muchi-Rishi of South West Bangladesh - an ex-
Untouchable group who in part converted to Christianity. Their interaction over time (1856-1999) 
with different Catholic missionary institutions highlights the more general theme discussed in the 
paper: the ethics of cross-cultural encounter. On a more theoretical level, a 'return' to philosophies of 
dialogue postulates the need for ethics as an indispensable move towards a meaningful dialogue, 
both inter and cross-cultural, encompassing tensions and 'political' implications. The works of 
Gadamer, Bakhtin, Levinas, Derrida and Gramsci, provide useful insights, but are also put to the test 
by the 'dialogues' in the field.
     'Dialogue
,' a recurrent term in the history of western thought, has increasingly 
become part of our daily vocabulary. Its original meaning, referring to the orality of 
conversation, has expanded to include communication, exchange, polyvocality, 
relationship, negotiation and their synonyms, revealing a multipurpose concept 
accommodating open and hidden intentionalities. This gives, as a result, a multi-layered 
word, almost a theme, hardly useful - it would seem - to assist analytical enquiry. This 
ambiguity, however, as part of the dynamics of dialogue, reflects the complexity of 
human relations. If it is true that "human cultural experience is coming to be viewed as 
a dialogue between partial truths" (Mumford 1989:11), it should also be pointed out 
that questions of truth often embody questions of power. This can be the case when 
dialogue is utilised by those in power to protest their willingness to serve a good cause. 
My aim here is both to unmask a certain deception in the use of dialogue and to re-
affirm its validity within two different but related fields: missionary activity and 
anthropological enquiry. In both fields, in fact, when matters have come to a crisis, 
'dialogue' has been invoked to solve a perennial problem. This manipulation of 
dialogue, however, does not take account of various factors: firstly, the openness and 
uncertainty of the outcome that surround dialogue itself, independent of the intentions 
of the participants; secondly, the resourcefulness and ability of the counterpart to reply 
(and, for that matter, their freedom to ignore being called into dialogue); and thirdly, the
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variety of interpretations of dialogue greeted by both missionaries and anthropologists 
with a combination of eagerness and suspicion. As a result, instead of solving the crisis, 
missionary activity and anthropological enquiry are often left on even more uncertain 
and problematic grounds. No easy solution can come from a 'nice' word (dialogue) used 
as a camouflage to continue the same game of invading the space of the Other, with the 
intention of either converting or representing him, unless the Self goes through a 'real' 
crisis, which implies a growth towards the discovery of the Other's proximity. In what 
follows I propose to challenge and re-affirm the use of dialogue in the field of 
missionary activity, since this represents an extreme instance of sophistry, but without 
neglecting the position of anthropology since both missionaries and anthropologists fail 
to justify the 'violence' of their invasion. 
     When 'dialogue' is invoked at any particular historic juncture to establish a 
renewed approach to the Other, the suspicion arises that the power of the sword (or that 
of money, or of 'academic discourse') has failed to obtain the desired results. This 
picture becomes more complicated, but also more interesting from our point of view, 
when some missionaries, decide to take dialogue seriously and, contravening the 
authority of the Church, challenge, at least in part, their own vocation and identity, as 
these are understood at an official level. In re-addressing their own activity and way of 
being, they risk subverting the image of the missionary as one who goes abroad to 
make new 'converts' to Christianity. As we shall see, for many missionaries and 
theologians who have being shaken by the encounter with the Other, dialogue 
represents an alternative approach to missionary activity itself. The fear that the original 
message has lost its purity, can be compared with the absence of 'objectivity' in social 
anthropology when the discipline becomes too entangled with the Other. In addition to 
recognising the impact they have on societies they study, the anthropologists "in turn 
find themselves transformed internally by their informants" (Mumford 1989:11). It is 
this level of uncomfortable and disquieting dialogue, as opposed to a dialogic genre of 
ethnographic writing or a general notion of missionary dialogue as alibi, that most 
interests me. For just as in the case of anthropological investigation, intent to go beyond 
positivism and scientism, "it is not enough to cast the 'results' into a dialogic form" 
(Fabian 1990:765), so for missionary activity there is a need to face the internal 
upheaval of taking the Other seriously. 
     In this paper I propose to refer, as an example, to the Christianisation of a group 
of ex-Untouchables, the (Muchi)-Rishi of South-West Bangladesh - leather-workers and 
musicians - and their interaction with various Catholic missionary groups over the 
period 1856-1999. The importance given to dialogue both in missionary circles' and the 
introduction of this term in anthropology2 has led me to concentrate on dialogue both as
90
                                              The Ethics of Cross-Cultural Dialogue 
the place where new missionary trends can be tested, and as a need felt by social 
anthropologists for a different approach to Otherness.
Dialogue in the Field 
     My first visit to the field (Catholic Diocese of Khulna) in 1982-83 was at a time 
when mission theology had developed many ideas already present in Vatican II, 
concerning renewal, inculturation, and adaptation. At the same time, the phenomenon 
of secularisation that informed western Christianity was reaching the mission field: the 
crisis of colonialism and neo-colonialism, the emergence of local churches and local 
theologies, the failure of developmentism and the role of local governments, were 
putting under pressure a missionary identity which in the past had been oriented, 
through the idiom of 'saving souls', to imposing Christian western values on others. 
Khulna Diocese reflected this general disposition for renewal, where old and new 
missionary ideologies were opposing each other. The Rishi, who totalled almost sixty 
per cent of the Catholic population, were often taken as a testing-ground for the new 
approach and they were made the object of concern through 'New Paths' of missionary 
activity. Since 1980 some missionaries have abandoned the parish structure to live 
among the Hindu Rishi (Chuknagar-Tala) with the purpose of serving them in their 
needs and sharing life with them, without seeking their conversion. This 'paradox' was 
inspired by the new idiom of 'dialogue' which was becoming the key-word for a 
different missionary approach. 
     If dialogue for some missionaries represents a camouflage of the old idiom of 
'saving souls'
, still centred on conversion, it also announces a move away from this 
position towards a more open encounter. Furthermore, if dialogue initially concerned 
the activity of the Church in the so-called 'mission territories,' it has now become a 
widely spread idiom for addressing religious pluralism in western societies (Barnes 
1989; Rizzi 1991). My intention here is not to discuss the relationship between 
anthropologists and missionaries (cf. Bonsen, Marks, Miedema: 1990) but to assess 
their common experience of dialogue and encounter with the Other, for both 
Christianity and anthropology went hand in hand with colonisation and both rest on the 
same metaphysics.3 
     Fieldwork was conducted between October 1988 and September 1989 and I 
spent my first period among the Hindu Rishi of the Chuknagar-Tala-Dumuria area, this 
being also the place of the most recent missionary involvement with the Rishi. Given 
the Rishis' recent encounter with Christianity, it was vital to address their experience as 
Hindus and 'Untouchables', and to highlight in particular their understanding and
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implementation of 'Hindu dharma', in order to understand the real nature of their 
conversion/aggregation to Christianity. Though returning periodically to Chuknagar, I 
moved, in fact, to the Baradal Christian community, the most recent (1937) among the 
Rishi Christians. Subsequently, I stayed in Satkhira parish where missionary presence 
was first established in c. 1917 and later in Simulia where the Rishi had been 
missionised since 1856. My territorial movement was soon followed by a journey into 
the past: in the parishes I gathered historical data in the form of missionary diaries and 
reports, leading to further research in archives both in Bangladesh and Europe, 
sufficient to retrace the early history of the Rishi mission (1856-1952). 
     Soon after the Partition of India (1947), mission territories were reshaped and, 
though the Rishi were divided as well, the majority of them came under the newly 
created Khulna Diocese which, from 1952, has been entrusted to the Xaverians, an 
Italian missionary institute. They are still present in considerable numbers there, but the 
direction of the Diocese has been transferred, since 1970, to a local Bangladeshi 
bishop. 
     The presence of a number of missionary institutions among the Rishi until 1952, 
their open or latent competition, the varying styles of individual missionaries vis-a-vis 
the Rishi, and the interaction of both missionaries and Rishi with the wider society, 
generated a multiplicity of dialogues which were most of the time destined to remain 
frustrated. In the most recent phase, from 1952 onwards, ambiguities and perplexities 
have not diminished and, despite a more serious missionary commitment towards the 
Rishi, the Xaverians feel all the burden of past history and present choices.
Dialogue and Missionary Ideology 
     Ten years after the Xaverians entered East Pakistan, the Catholic Church began 
the celebration of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), which was to revolutionise 
mission theology: a desire for 'dialogue' with cultures and other religious ways was 
replacing the old 'conversion of the unfaithful.' Furthermore, the missionaries, in daily 
contact with peoples, their cultures and their religions, were themselves very much part 
of this process and strongly encouraged its development. By the end of the seventies, a 
missionary magazine with contributions from the field, Fede e Civilta (Faith and 
Civilisation), changed its name to Missione Oggi (Mission Today), as if to symbolise 
the changed reality both in the field and at home. The contributions from the mission 
presented less a representation of the Other, more a self-presentation of the 
missionary's role and identity (Zene 1993). It is argued here that, if the theoretical basis 
for missionary 'dialogue' found its ground in the West, it was in the field that this
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'dialogue' was tested and became either a camouflage for the same aim as before
, i.e. 
conversions, or a basis for a different kind of encounter with the Other. This second 
stance gives us the opportunity to analyse not only a change in missionary position, 
dictated by a different mission theology, but also, at a deeper level, a change of 
relationship between what we could label the Self of the western missionaries and the 
Other of Bangladeshi Christians, Hindus and Muslims. Following Levinas, I will 
suggest that it is the desire to meet this Other in his own 'alterity,' to establish a 
'dialogue of life' with him
, which motivated the Self to go beyond its obstinate search 
for the 'conversion' of the Other. As a result some missionaries, who understood 
conversion not as a change of faith but as a change of heart, felt the need to realise their 
own conversion to the Other. Completely subverting established positions, it is the 
Other, the Rishi, the poor, the Untouchable, the 'unfaithful', the Tribal, the Hindu, the 
Muslim.... who asks the missionary to convert himself. Natural disasters such as 
cyclones, droughts and famines, and political events such as the creation of Pakistan, 
the War of Liberation of 1971 and the Independence of Bangladesh in 1972, have been 
important moments for missionaries and Bangladeshis to renegotiate their relationship 
and to destabilise conventional understandings of 'conversion'. Though interested in a 
localised dialogue, we can afford to ignore, neither the multiplicity of dialogues in 
which this particular dialogue is embedded, nor a more general ideology of dialogue 
which has informed mission activity in recent years.
Dialogue and Anthropology 
     Returning from the field I needed to readjust my perspective to understand 
'dialogue' not simply as a restricted phenomenon of mission theology and practice
, but 
as a perception so extensive that it has informed Western thought, including social 
anthropology. The initial usage of dialogue in anthropology, however, seemed to be 
restricted to reproducing the communicative nature of fieldwork in the final 
presentation of ethnographic texts. As Fabian says: "a reification of genre .... may result 
in the degeneration of critical epistemological diagnosis into the literary 'therapy' of 
ethnography." (Fabian 1990:762) Indeed, this sort of 'functional dialogue,' adopted to 
solve contingent issues, is destined to repeat the errors of the past, given that it seems 
centred on self-justification, that the 'fragmented subject' is still in command, and that 
economic and political power relations tend to be dismissed as irrelevant. Having 
reminded us that when dialogue made its appearance during this century it was as part 
of 'soft existentialism' (Buber) and of 'hard critical theory' (Habermas), Fabian 
disqualifies its emergence in anthropology:
93
Anthropologists began to think seriously about dialogue at a time when, in general usage, 
the term had reached a low in signification. It acquired a nonspecific ethical bonhomie, 
oozing good will, apparently lacking any cutting edge that would be required for critical 
work (Fabian: 1990: 763).
     He points out that dialogue was first introduced "not to signal an ethical 
attitude.... but to serve as a reflection about the nature of anthropological 
fieldwork"(ibid.). This was later extended to the dialogical form of ethnographic 
writing, but without solving a complex epistemological dilemma, given that the crisis of 
the authoring subject, its representation of reality and its othering role did not originate 
in anthropology, although anthropology epitomised the crisis better than other 
disciplines. 
     The experience of 'fieldwork' using the technique of 'participant observation' has 
played an important role in establishing anthropology as a discipline in its own right, 
but the dialogue conducted in the field did not necessarily modify the anthropologist's 
dialogue pursued at home, since achievements in the field acquired meaning only when 
validated by a dialogue at home in terms of the 'ruling' trends of thought (cf. Appadurai 
1988a:16-17). This restrictive interpretation of western anthropology can also be 
applied to the so-called 'native' anthropologist, whose professionalism is exhibited 
through his dialogue either with the community of anthropologists at home or with 
anthropologists at large. In both cases, the anthropologist did not set off for the field 
'empty-headed' but well equipped with social theories, research strategies and 
hypotheses to be tested. Even the unexpected findings or 'surprises' that emerged in the 
course of fieldwork would be diluted or 'adjusted' in order to satisfy the western reader 
or to fit 'academic requirements'. The very 'language' the anthropologist was asked to 
produce was necessarily conditioned by the rules of this 'internal dialogue' with the 
'near Other' about' distant Others' (cf. Asad 1986:159). 
     The post-modern debate which dominates contemporary philosophy and 
informs contemporary social anthropology, has shown a powerful reaction against this 
state of affairs and has taken different directions in an attempt to solve this impasse. A 
strange situation has evolved in relation to the relevance of dialogue as part of an ideal 
solution: on the one hand, dialogue, invoked by post-modernity in order to eliminate 
authorial hegemony, seems ineffective in exposing other hegemonies;4 on the other, 
dialogue appears unable to save anthropology from the present circumstances of a 
fragmented reality. 
     Those who deny social anthropology the likelihood of surviving its present 
crisis are also those who deny the possibility of dialogue in anthropology, and while the 
'anthropological present' - "capturing" the other in his time - is exorcised as the actual
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evil, anthropology is denied a future to redeem itself. There is no doubt that 
      ... insofar as 'participant observation' is really interested in observing rather than 
      participating ... it is epistemologically committed to the sovereignty of observation and its 
      monologue about the Other rather than the democracy of genuine participation and its 
     dialogue with the Other" (McGrane 1989: 124).
     On the other hand, it seems there is no escape for anthropology, whose " 
'scientific method' is the decay of dialogue
, the sustained, cultivated, and 
epistemologically enforced atrophy of dialogue" (ibid.: 127), given that too much 
participation spoils the method. Thus, paraphrasing Foucault, as psychiatry has been the 
West's monologue about madness, so anthropology has been the monologue about the 
Other (ibid.). When today anthropology has adopted an implicit cultural relativism, this 
becomes a subtle way for 'redomestication and annihilation of difference', given that 
anthropology, made strong by its relativist consciousness, "sees how the alien is 
imprisoned in his cultural absolutism" and superiority over him is re-established. The 
anthropologist has either to continue his solipsistic play, where "this intercourse or 
dialogue is a fantasy, a mask, covering over and hiding his analytic monologue or 
masturbation," or following Castaneda's example, to become a native, and destroy what 
is left of anthropology (ibid.: 125-26). 
     Curiously enough, McGrane bases part of his critique of dialogue on Fabian 
(1983), while the latter, on the contrary, recognises the importance of "continued 
exploration of the dialogical nature of ethnographic research" (Fabian 1990:764). 
      To preserve the dialogue with our interlocutors, to assure the Other's presence against the 
      distancing devices of anthropological discourse, is to continue conversing with the Other at 
      all levels of writing, not just to reproduce dialogues. In fact, I have gone as far as saying 
      precisely that if fieldwork is conducted dialogically, problems with writing will not be 
      resolved by adopting the dialogical form (ibid.:766). 
      Moreover, Fabian is opposed to the radical form of 'graphic silence', since "to 
stop writing about the Other will not bring liberation" (ibid.:760), but he advocates the 
position whereby 'not-writing is a moment of writing', in the sense that he dissociates 
ethnographic data from the process of producing monographs. For this reason he 
proposes to "transform ethnography into a praxis capable of making the Other present 
(rather than making representations predicated on the Other's absence)..." (ibid.:771). 
     With this in mind, I propose to extend the discussion to the field of philosophy, 
to be discussed later on, for two reasons: firstly, social anthropology would benefit from 
a more extensive understanding of dialogue itself and, secondly, anthropology could 
contribute to the empirical testing of philosophical hypotheses, given the very concrete 
nature of its Other. Furthermore, as will become apparent from our case study, the Self
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does not dictate the rules of dialogue and very often it is the Other who teaches the Self 
faithfulness to pursue dialogue in spite of misunderstandings and failures. This 
becomes for the anthropologist an ongoing learning process which destabilises his 
certainties and decontextualises his foreignness (or exteriority). 
     For this very reason, writing about dialogue raises a series of problematic issues 
connected with orality and literacy, conversation and textualization, speech and 
translation. In order to clarify my own understanding of dialogue, I need firstly to 
recognise that I am not the main agent (or subject) of the dialogue I have witnessed in 
the field between the Rishi and the missionaries. My own dialogue with them is only 
partial, fleeting and far from exhaustive. Nevertheless, a dialogue observed and 
witnessed can be taken to include the observer, following Bakhtin's idea of 'inclusion': 
"One who does not participate in the dialogue but understands it" (Bakhtin 1990
:125). 
In addition, it is a parameter for a different level of dialogue, which takes place after the 
field experience, with those who were not present at my "primary dialogue" or the past 
"primary dialogue" between the Rishi and the missionaries. 
     Secondly, I distinguish the oral and literary genres, in which dialogue per se is 
embedded, from a 'dialogical principle' which informs my reading of existence. The 
application of this 'dialogical principle' overcomes the limitations of a reductionist 
definition of dialogue, which can be understood not only as a 'conversation', but also as 
its absence. Only in this way can we accept that dialogue, following its etymology, is 
"... a speech across, between, through two people. It is a passing through and a going 
apart. There is both a transformational dimension to dialogue and an oppositional one -
an agonistic one. It is a relationship of considerable tension" (Crapanzano 1990:276). 
The dialogical tension present in dialogue comprehends the many modes of human 
communication so that what has been seen as distinct from dialogue (at least in 
anthropological circles), such as the 'monograph'(Crapanzano 1990:276), can be 
reinterpreted as a dialogical product. On the other hand, many pseudo-dialogical 
writings can be stripped of their pretence of being in dialogue (Tyler 1990:293). 
     Eurocentrism during its long history has delivered to the non-European Other a 
'message of salvation'
, firstly through Christian truths (Renaissance), then the power of 
reason (Enlightenment), and cultural evolution (nineteenth century), attaining lately a 
final message in relativism, which continues, however, to represent a new form of 
superiority over the Other, for only we are aware of it. Nevertheless, even relativism is 
the result of tensions present within a supposedly unitary European history in relation 
to its Other, and the idea of a single domineering logos does not account for the diverse 
and often contradictory relation of Europe to its Other. 
     When anthropology is translated to the realm of dialogue, a multiplicity of
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dialogues, to be sure, anthropological 'knowledge' does not belong to a corpus and is 
not a personal possession of the individual anthropologist, since this 'knowledge' is 
subordinate to the Other with whom dialogue is never ended and never ending. This is 
something more than and something different from cultural relativism, for it does not 
originate from truth claims. Only when truth is suspended and the Other welcomed is 
there a chance to discover the intensity of a project-discipline called anthropos-logia, 
where the logos is not the violent reductio ad unum of Greek philosophy but takes into 
account the diversity of positions even within European thought vis-a-vis Otherness, as 
well as the presence of 'Others' within Europe itself. This different understanding of a 
'weak logos' anticipates the interpretation of knowledge-learning through suffering 
(pathei-mathos), and is closer to the Levinasian idea of empathy (suffering with), thus 
"learning the truth of man through the perception of his absence in the Other" (Rizzi 
1991:202). Perhaps the equation of truth with com-passion opens up new possibilities 
"to find a reconciliation between the need to evaluate and a desirable will for dialogue" 
(ibid.: 196).
Fictional Dialogues, or the 'Framing' of the Other 
     The use of 'dialogue', or better of fictional and apparent dialogues (cf. Murray 
1991) in the mission field has a long history in Bengali Christianity. In 1599, the Jesuit 
Fr. De Souza translated into Bengali a Christian treatise confuting the 'errors' of other 
religions. To this he attached a short catechism written in the form of 'dialogue', but the 
book has been lost (J. Sarkar 1973:369). Some eighty years later, a Bengali convert, 
Don Antonio de Rosario, wrote another 'dialogue' between a Christian and a Hindu 
Brahmin, in order to show the falsity of Hinduism and the truthfulness of Christianity. 
In the following century, the then superior of the Augustinians in Bengal, Fr. Manoel 
D'Assumpcao, translated Don Antonio's book into Portuguese, the object being to make 
it easy for the missionaries to hold discussions in the Bengali language with the 
Hindus.5 The work was printed in Lisbon in 1743 and gives the Bengali and 
Portuguese texts in parallel columns (Silva-Rego 1955/XI: 673-4). In 1836, Fr. Guerin, 
vicar at Chandernagar, published a new edition of this book (Hosten 1914b). 
     Another related episode was the controversy which originated among the 
Augustinians in Bengal when, following the visit there in c. 1712 of Laynes, the Bishop 
of Mylapore (Josson 1921/1:109-110), Fr. Jorze da Presentacao and Fr. Eugenio 
Trigueiros were sent to Bengal. While the former "finds difficulty in the fact that his 
European studies of theology had not properly prepared him for the many situations 
that confronted him in India" (Hartmann 1978:125), the latter had difficulties
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collaborating with his Portuguese confreres born in India. These, in fact, used the 
Portuguese language to teach their native Christians with the result that these Christians 
would not accept being taught in Bengali.6 When Trigueiros tried to persuade them to 
accept the catechism in their native language, many resisted and the clashes over the 
language question lasted several years. He even wrote some treatises in Bengali but his 
opponents reported back to Goa that he was teaching in Sanskrit like the Brahmins 
(Hartmann 1978:196). 
      These events which pre-date the missionary-Rishi encounter are, nonetheless, 
useful in situating our enquiry within a broader framework. On the one hand, they 
contrast with the sources presented by Murray (1991), and on the other, they offer a 
clear counterpart to the North American Indian-white relations. Murray's study is of 
great importance to our line of enquiry since it concentrates and analyses in depth many 
themes that are only touched upon in this paper. After dealing at great length with 
problems concerning the translation of the Christian message, stressing the inequality 
of power and knowledge between cultures and languages, Murray deals with the 
representation and textualization of Indian speech and speeches, "speaking in a 
Christian voice" (35). Similarly to the Bengali scene, 'apparent dialogues' are created 
where "the Indians are presented as having an independent voice", but serving the 
power of the ruling discourse. Moving beyond Foucault who foresees a resistance to 
power 'in silence rather than discourse' (52), Murray presents the figures of two literate 
Christian Indians, Occom and Apes, who were highly polemical against the whites but, 
at the same time, offer 'an olive branch'. Indeed, 
      As a way of avoiding what threatens to become the dead ends of theories of closed 
      epistemes and discourses, which are good at explaining how we are locked into systems but 
      offer no way out, the idea of dialogue and even of presence has been seen as having special 
      relevance to those groups denied any specific identity within the dominant discourses.... 
     (Murray 1991:52). 
     Issues of orality and literacy are further discussed in relation to Indian 
autobiographies. In spite of being a genre suited to satisfying white sensibilities, 
autobiographies remain an ambiguous response to white culture, since "... in their 
bicultural hybrid form ... the different registers of language sometimes combine and 
sometimes struggle for dominance". In the case of Black Elk, for instance, his genius 
"lay in organising Lakota religion according to a Christian framework, emphasising 
characteristics amenable to expression in symbols reminiscent of Christian symbols, yet 
keeping a Lakota essence" (Kehoe 1989:69; see de Certeau 1988). Another successful, 
'civilised' Indian
, Eastman, 'becomes an Indian spokesman, increasingly critical of 
white policies', to the point of questioning the validity of his 'conversion' to Christianity,
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given that "white society does not embody those values of Christianity for which he has 
been made to renounce his past" (Murray 1991:78). 
     The discussion on Indian Dialogues, published by the missionary John Eliot in 
1671, becomes an invitation for Murray to conclude his study by concentrating on 
'dialogues and dialogics' as a central theme of anthropological debate. If power records 
other voices to be subjugated, it cannot escape registering a subversive presence in 
these voices which undermine the discourse of power itself (see de Certeau 1988; 
1992). It may also be true that "we locate as 'subversive' in the past precisely those 
things that are not subversive to ourselves, that pose no threat to the order by which we 
live" (Greenblatt 1981:52), and that "cultural spaces of possible resistance" (Porter 
1988:767) can be re-absorbed and nullified by the dominant discourse, but this is not 
the whole answer. Unfortunately Murray's discussion of anthropologists working with 
the Zuni (Cushing, Ruth Benedict and Tedlock), leads him to equate reflexive with 
dialogical anthropology (Murray 1991: 134), which results in a most ambiguous 
position. While on the one hand, he recognises that "dialogical and dialectical 
approaches... challenge the whole opposing categories of subjective and objective and 
the rhetorical forms that accompany them" (ibid.: 133), on the other, he points "to a very 
real question about whether dialogue is really an epistemological and methodological 
as much as a political and moral issue" (ibid.: 146). However, given the 'slipperiness of 
terms like dialogue', the decision must be whether dialogue is "an end in itself or a 
means to a different end" (ibid.). The example of Cushing, discussed at length by 
Murray, shows that his 'going native' was only meant to acquire knowledge of the Zuni 
('They love me and I learn'). But Cushing's becoming an Indian "ultimately skirts the 
question of the loss of self" (ibid.: 140). This result is to be expected when epistemology 
and methodology take over the moral and political, which, in my view, are not only the 
real issues concerning dialogue, but provide the basis for unmasking 'fictive and 
deceitful dialogues'.
The 'Topoi' of Multiple Dialogues 
     A study of vernacular Rishi Christianity must take into account the complex 
environment in which the Rishi experience being Christians: thus, their Hindu 
background, their Untouchability, their relationship with the Hindu Rishi, with other 
Hindus and with the Muslim majority, their association with other local Christians and 
with the foreign missionaries, are all important elements of a composite mosaic which 
enter into their choices as Christians. The ability and shrewdness of the Hindu Rishi in 
establishing a dialogue/negotiation with society in order to affirm their identity and
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dignity, are transposed by the Christian Rishi into the new environment and, despite 
ambiguities and perplexities which paralyse both Hindu and Christian Rishi, their 
perseverance has enabled them to achieve some results. 
     This multiplicity of dialogues can be further analysed from the perspective of 
'place' in addition to that of 'voice'
, for "the problem of voice ('speaking for' and 
'speaking to') intersects with the problem of place (speaking 'from'
, and speaking 'of)" 
(Appadurai 1988a:17). The displacement imposed on the Rishi by their status as 
'Untouchables'
, is contrasted with the voluntary displacement of the missionary (and the 
anthropologist)7. Thus, "the circumstantial encounter of the voluntarily displaced 
anthropologist and the involuntarily localized 'other' " (ibid.:16), is marked by the 
former's power to 'locate and locute'. The Rishi, indeed, appear as framed in a double 
displacement, firstly by their society and secondly by those who "bound [them] ... to 
the circumstanciality of place" (Appadurai 1988b:38). The recurrent contrast between 
centres of production and peripheries of imposed images in recent anthropological 
literature seems to give much attention to the power of 'voices' coming from the centres 
disregarding the potentiality of peripheral voices. For this reason, "the dialogical 
situation becomes far more complicated - more productive of selves in the encounter" 
(Crapanzano 1991:442), given that these selves are not fixed in time and space. In fact, 
to the real and physical place occupied by the Rishi (both in society and that ascribed to 
them by the ethnographer) there is also an 'imagined place', which is not only imagined 
by others (other jatis, the missionary, the anthropologist...), but by the Rishi 
themselves. It is at this stage that, moving from location to locution, the Rishi negotiate 
and re-negotiate their placement and dis-placement. This is shown in their ability to 
ignore missionary discourse, to re-interpret it to their own advantage and to make use of 
those means, such as trials (bicar), to impose their reading of events. 
     Although some missionaries, as we have seen, accept a further displacement 
vis-a-vis the Church structure and discourse, this is not enough to guarantee an 
egalitarian dialogue with the Rishi, since missionaries still retain the power to place 
themselves where they like, while this is denied to the Rishi. However, missionary 
choice made at the nodality of the Rishis' social life, creates peripheralness for the 
missionaries, which results in a new nodality for missionary identity (Soja 1989:149). 
The Rishi, in turn, take advantage of missionary involvement at the periphery without 
renouncing the advantages of those Christians who are at the centre of missionary 
attention. In either case, and although much depends on the 'good will' (intentionality) 
of the missionaries at the periphery, the Rishis' capability to engage in a fruitful 
negotiation results from their multi-peripheral position which is able to destabilise the 
centre, with dialogue creating tension rather than mere agreement. If one semantic root
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of dialogue as con-versation points to 'conversion' (conversare, convergere, conversio -
converse, convergence, conversion), another one points to di-version, inversion and 
refraction, which are 'not bound necessarily to echo the voice of metropolitan fantasy' 
(Dresch 1988).8 
     Thus, the multiple displacement of the localised Rishi does not prevent them 
from attaining some results through which Christianity is for them something more and 
something different from the 'salvation' proposed in missionary discourse. In fact, their 
understanding of Christianity has come to include total salvation, even in everyday life. 
In this sense, although I share Appadurai's concern that "the problem of place and voice 
is ultimately a problem of power", I would not underestimate the power of 'localised 
others', and I would be careful not to quantify dialogue as relevant only when "there are 
as many persons in Papua New Guinea studying Philadelphia" (1988a:20). This would 
imply capitulating to the theory that the 'mobile outsiders and observers .... are the 
movers, the seers, the knowers' (Appadurai 1988b:37), be they from Philadelphia or 
Papua New Guinea. 
      In sum, on the one hand, I suggest paying more attention to the inventiveness of 
the 'localised other' in displacing discourses of power and, on the other, I foresee for 
both the missionary and the anthropologist, a further displacement which is irreducible 
to comprehension and signification, given that their place is to be constantly displaced 
(u-topos) and the voice is that of the Other saying "Thou shall not kill!".
'Philosophies of Dialogue' Reconsidered 
     The works of Bakhtin, Gadamer, Levinas, Derrida and to some extent of 
Gramsci, will help us to clarify both the Rishi-missionary encounter and 
anthropological enquiry. Apart from the obvious theme of dialogue, all seem to 
highlight the need for the Self to assume its responsibilities, to renounce a 'murderous 
freedom', and to become, in a word, an ethical Self. This 'ethical dialogue', disrupting 
the status quo from its very foundations, addresses questions of power and politics and 
nullifies the false pretensions of a functional, fictional and innocuous dialogue. The 
implications of ethics vis-a-vis politics and the space it provides for a meaningful 
anthropological enquiry, will be further reflected upon in the final part of our essay.
Bakhtin's Dialogism 
     Bakhtin's literary criticism has inspired the work of many anthropologists,9 one 
of the latest and most consistent being Mumford (1989). His reading of Bakhtin
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discloses how 'interpenetrating consciousnesses and interacting subjectivities emerge 
historically' as part of 'unbounded and layered cultures' in which dialogue occurs. His 
analysis of dialogic process in Asia "illuminates Bakhtin's Western example, eroding 
the outdated boundary between East and West" (ibid.: 20).10 Reflecting upon the 
movement from 'inner subjectivity' to 'intersubjectivity', Mumford underlines how 
"Bakhtin's writings are preoccupied with hierarchy in language styles and the manner in 
which hegemonic, 'authoritative' utterances situated in a locus of power come to be 
undermined by counter-hegemonic voices in the periphery.... Hegemonic discourse, 
having become 'internally persuasive,' is later 'laughed out of existence' ...... (ibid.: 15). 
     Bakhtin's 'philosophical anthropology' is rooted in dialogism, understood as the 
basis of language, society and the self. For Bakhtin the uniqueness of the self is not an 
absolute but can exist only dialogically in relation to other selves (Clark-Holquist 1984: 
65). 
       ".... I achieve self-consciousness; I become myself only by revealing myself to another, 
      through another and with another's help. The most important acts, constitutive of self-
      consciousness, are determined by the relation to another consciousness (a thou). Cutting 
      oneself off, isolating oneself off, those are the basic reasons for the loss of self..." (Bakhtin, 
      M. 1979, quoted in Todorov 1984b: 96). 
     The Rishi too understand that, as a group, they need the others to achieve self-
consciousness and, in their long struggle to be recognised as 'humans', they make use of 
the language and signs of those from whom they seek to extract this recognition. Thus 
against the Hindu myths recounting the Rishi's low status they counterpose other myths 
inspired by a different understanding of 'history'." They observe, as best they can, 
Hindu rites and festivals, though often in a spirit of 'carnival', and they are served by 
their own 'Brahman' priests. They make repeated efforts to abandon their profitable 
occupation of skinning which renders them 'dirty' in the eyes of other jatis. Thus they 
seek to pass from being no-body, no-person, no-other to being somebody, a person and 
an 'other' a 'Thou' (see Zene 1994 and 2000 forthcoming). 
     The Rishi are continually conditioned by an other-ascribed identity, which is in 
conflict with how they would wish to perceive themselves, causing a sort of individual 
and collective schizophrenia. As non-Muslims, non-accepted Hindus, it is difficult for 
them, as well as for other minority groups, to be Bangladeshis. Furthermore, the 
Muslim majority, at least on a mass level, has seen its identity repeatedly imposed from 
above by those who need to justify monologism under the hegemony of a unified 
national Islamic identity. This results in the alienation of those who do not belong to 
this majority, for Islamization of the country has often been conceived as the means to 
create a unique national consciousness, with no place for 'plurality of consciounesses' at
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any level. 
     One response to their isolation has been the creation of Thare or Thar Basa 
(Rishi language). Thare is a corruption of Bengali, in which Bengali words and sounds 
are used with a different meaning and often combined with a 'sign language'. Not being 
listened to, both on a ritual and everyday speech level, the Rishi felt the need to create a 
language by which they could communicate excluding the others, in the way they had 
previously been excluded, thus establishing unity and community, at least among 
themselves. In a more Bakhtinian spirit we could say that 
      .... If my "I" is so ineluctably a product of the particular values dominating my community at 
      the particular point in its history when I coexist with it, the question must arise, "Where is 
      there any space, and what would the time be like, in which I might definemyself against an 
      otherness that is other from that which has been 'given' to me?" 
     One space found by the Rishi is at the very heart of dialogue and 
communication, i.e. language. In this sense they are close to other minority groups in 
Bangladesh who struggle to keep their language and themselves alive. They represent 
the 'centrifugal forces', not as opposed to, but as coexistent with the 'centripetal force', 
as long as coexistence is possible and accepted (Todorov 1984b: 57). 
     Another space is provided by Christianity. The peculiar situation of the Rishi 
who 'converted', which cannot be explained only in terms of 'indigence' (since, were 
this the case, many more would have converted), can be explained in dialogic terms as 
the acquisition of a self-consciousness stemming from the Rishis' aspiration to be 
treated as 'others', as persons. If, on the one hand, their hope has been partially fulfilled, 
on the other, they still struggle to achieve an integration with the human community at 
large. The division within the group, between those who converted and those who did 
not, betrays a deeper inherent division: either to be accepted as persons renouncing the 
totality of the community, or to stay and struggle from within the Hindu Rishi 
community, waiting to be recognised as 'persons'. Furthermore, the partial realisation of 
the Christian Rishis' aspiration is doubly endangered: not only are they not recognised 
as part of the whole Christian community, since as soon as their Rishi origin is 
disclosed they will be labelled 'Muchi Khristan', but they are also discriminated against 
within the Catholic community as 'Nuton Khristan' (newly converted Christians), with 
all the implications that this sarcasm entails. Nevertheless, their capacity to patiently 
establish dialogue even at this level is reaping its rewards. The number of priests 
belonging to the group is growing and the self-confidence this has engendered raises 
the possibility that in the near future a Rishi might guide the community as bishop, 
without having to depend on the 'old Catholics' of Dhaka. 
     The 'theological' bases from which Bakhtin moves on to affirm dialogism, are
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not very dissimilar from those invoked by Catholic theology to support interreligious 
dialogue. Despite the many labels attached to Bakhtin's thought, which has received a 
variety of interpretations (cf. Morson & Emerson 1990), he does not cease to inspire 
new reflections, including theological ones (Lindsey 1993). Furthermore, the idea of 
kenosis, so vital in the Bakhtinian search for integration of spirituality and corporeality, 
is what motivated in recent years a missionary shift from an interest in 'saving souls' to 
an interest in the totality of the human being, providing thus a theoretical justification 
('evangelization') for the commitment of the Church in those areas normally considered 
as belonging to so-called 'Christian charity'. Kenosis also provided support for the 
'incarnation theory' in missionary activity, according to which the transmission of the 
Christian message has to be realised by means of 'acculturation'. By this is intended not 
only the appropriation of cultural local values into Christianity, but also the personal 
commitment of the missionary to 'incarnate' him or herself in a given situation. All this, 
however, is not sufficient to guarantee a perception of the other free from the intention 
of assimilating the other to the self. The certainty of possessing the truth, and the 'logic' 
of dispensing this truth to others, is what in the past caused, and to some extent still 
causes, the proclamation of Christianity in monologic terms. Nevertheless, the 
multiplicity of missionary positions reveals that monologism is no longer the only 
option in missionary activity. 
     If Bakhtin's intuition motivates a postmodern trend, given that "traditions can no 
longer be grasped within finalized boundaries [and].... the unbounded self and the 
unfinished culture emerge as an identity of betweenness..." (Mumford 1989: 17), it does 
not, however, favour quietism in the face of oppression and exploitation. If history is 
unfinished, it is because those at the periphery have been excluded, and inclusion does 
not seem to be a priority of liberal pluralism, which, like it or not, is a pupil of Judeo-
Christian tradition (see McGrane 1989:14-20;43-68). Certainly the missionaries who 
had most impact on the Rishi are those, both past and present, who had the capacity to 
listen to the Rishis' utterance (Amrao je manus! We too are Humans!) and to develop 
with them the meaning of what they uttered in accordance with the contribution of their 
listeners. To them, the Rishi made the gift of teaching their Thare language as a sign of 
belonging to one and the same community.
Gadamer's "Conversation that We Ourselves Are".
     The contribution of Gadamer to our dialogue springs from his need to re-
vindicate the originality of dialogue and orality as a solid foundation for hermeneutics, 
understood by him as a 'conversation with the text'. Through the proposed method of
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question and answer one achieves "the knowledge of not knowing" (Gadamer 1975: 
325), real learning is reached through suffering (pathei mathos), experience becomes 
experience of human finitude, and thus open to other experiences, and thinking is 
'being able to go on asking questions' (Ibid.: 330), for "asking it opens up possibilities 
of meaning" (Ibid.: 341). In this sense, Gadamer's discussion can serve as a challenge to 
both Rishi-missionary dialogue and anthropological research. 
     If we consider the importance of questioning in anthropology, primarily in the 
field, but also in the writing and reading of ethnography, we discover a close relation 
between Gadamer's hermeneutics and the 'primary dialogue' which takes place in the 
field. For, since hermeneutics has its roots in the 'I-Thou' relationship, and finds an 
explanation of understanding in the dialogue with the Other, so does an enquiring 
anthropology, which accepts the finitude of the Self-Other conversation as "infinite 
openness ... from the conversation that we ourselves are" (Gadamer 1975:340). 
       ... To reach an understanding with one's partner in a dialogue is not merely a matter of total 
      self expression and the successful assertion of one's own point of view, but a transformation 
      into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were (Gadamer 1975:341, emphasis 
     added). 
     The 'transformation' which occurs in the participants of a dialogue, the novelty 
of conversation, is marked, according to Gadamer, "in situations in which 
understanding is disrupted or made difficult". The mutuality of understanding in 
conversation is thus compared to the work of the translator in his attempt "to bridge the 
gap between languages". In this sense he attains a 'fusion of horizons': "the full 
realization of conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only mine or my 
author's, but common"(Thompson 1981:349). His discussion is particularly informative 
if we compare what has been said in anthropology under 'Cultural Translation'(Asad 
1986:159), with the situation analysed in our study, where we can distinguish between 
different levels of 'translation' which have occurred in the Rishi-missionary dialogue. 
     a) The most evident 'translation' in our case study is that carried out by the 
missionaries who from their language translate the Christian message into the language 
of the Rishi, which is Bengali plus something more (Rishi 'cosmology'). We can note 
here that the way of translating follows not only the original language of the 
missionaries in question (Italians and Belgians), but also their 'traditions', often 
informed by their regional background (and 'prejudices'). Furthermore, there is always 
the 'personal touch' of individual missionaries, and even though the message's 'main 
core' remains the same, the implementation differs, since the understanding of it also 
differs. 
     b) There is an 'interpretation' of the message by missionary collaborators, such
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as catechists, teachers and Rishi leaders, who 'appropriate' (see de Certeau 1988) the 
message, adding their own particular way of implementing it. Lately this has been 
elaborated and expanded by the presence of local priests, both Rishi and non-Rishi, 
with further interpretations. At both levels of 'translation' and 'interpretation' not only 
are there issues concerning understanding and communication, which do not escape 
power-relations, but also issues associated with 'transformation'. If we take for instance 
the word 'dharma', used by the missionaries to translate 'religion', we can see how this 
word has significantly changed for the Rishi who converted to Christianity and who 
now associate it with 'Khristan dharma'. The transformation, however, is by no means 
uni-directional, since for the missionaries too, 'religion', reinterpreted according to their 
own experience within the Rishi community and their daily contact with Muslims and 
Hindus, has undergone a remarkable and critical change. I certainly would not label this 
common transformation as a 'communion' or a 'fusion of horizons', since it is difficult to 
separate activity from individual 'intentionality', but I would agree with Gadamer that 
this "reveals something which henceforth exists" and that "we do not remain what we 
were". 
     c) Given the changed and changing missionary view on 'religion', there is a re-
translation of the message by the missionaries upon return to their home countries. Far 
from retaining the same qualities, this message takes on a new perception and 
interpretation. The encounter with the Other has certainly modified the original 
message, and even though, strictly speaking, the 'Dogmas of the Faith' have not 
changed, the way of understanding and implementing them has certainly been 
transformed. This feed-back, which re-establishes the old and new tension between the 
universality of the Christian message and the particular-local-vernacular way in which 
it is carried out, reveals not only an external change in missionary policy, but affects 
missionary identity as well. The choice of some missionaries, back home, to share their 
life with poor rural communities or with the people of inner-city slums, and their 
sensitivity towards 'relevant Others' such as the 'foreigners' and refugees in their own 
countries, demonstrates, if not a complete change of identity, at least a change of 
viewpoint destined to challenge the passivity or aggressiveness of western Christian 
communities. Moreover, missionary 'charisma' as a theological locus is not restricted 
geographically to Third World countries, but is applied to wherever they find 
themselves. 
     d) Very similar to this last instance of 'translation', even though the aims and 
content are different, is the 'translation' conducted by the ethnographer. In this case the 
anthropologist does not carry a particular message nor is the aim to 'convince' others to 
adhere to it, but, nevertheless, s/he still has a set of ideas and values ('tradition' and
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'prejudices') with which the Other is approached. Moreover, there is, above all, the need 
for the anthropologist to 'translate' the message of the Other for his/her audience. 
Fabian's suggestion of 'non-writing as part of writing' and his replacement of 
'representation' by 'praxis' "... as transformation in the conditions of relations with the 
Other ..." (Fabian 1990:755) seem pertinent here: "Praxis ... is not as such a remedy for 
what is wrong in our relations with the Other. It helps to create conditions for othering -
recognition of the Other that is not limited to representation of the Other" (ibid.:771). If 
the encounter with the Other has not minimally changed, refined, or brought into 
question the ideas and values with which the anthropologist initially set off for the field, 
it is apparent that the Other has been used to prove ideas, values and theories, as a 
mirror for the Self. When the Other is 'made present rather than represented' (Fabian), 
or when his 'proximity' is not nullified (Levinas), the 'inequality of languages' (Asad 
1986:159), which still persists, is certainly diminished, and the "authoritative textual 
representations" are in consequence reshuffled. The difference between the linguist and 
the anthropologist, as advocated by Asad, cannot be relegated to the area of 'implicit or 
unconscious meanings' presumed to be present in a cultural context.12 Even though the 
final result of the ethnographer's 'translation' "is inevitably a textual construct", it does 
not necessarily follow that "as representation it cannot normally be contested by the 
people to whom it is attributed", or that the "social authority of [an] ethnography" 
cannot be challenged. Given that "the failure of dialogue [is] figured as a genetic failure 
in the other, rather than a problem of cultural difference" (Cheyfitz 1989:352), 
inequality must be addressed at a deeper level. 
     The difference between linguist as translator and ethnographer appears to be 
minimal, according to Gadamer, when both see themselves as 'interpreters' of a given 
'text'. From what has been noted, Gadamer finds a strong resemblance between the 
interpretation of written texts and oral conversation; I would, however, prefer to 
distinguish the oral and the textual, following Levinas's face-to-face encounter with the 
Other. It is at this level that the anthropologist differs from the linguist; it is here that 
anthropology can offer to other disciplines a singular and original contribution, through 
claiming the face-to-face encounter with the Other - this 'exposure' - as its primary way 
of approaching Otherness. This Other is encountered and read as an 'open text' (in a 
Gadamerian sense), which can only be partially described/translated in a final 
ethnographic product. The 'textualization' of the Other as the final product of an 
ethnography, can never be a 'de-finition', in the sense that, encountering the Other and 
in dialogue with him, ethnography recognises its limitations and shortcomings, its 
historical finitude, its 'effective-historical consciousness', which takes into account "our 
many anthropological pasts" (Appadurai 1988a: 16).
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     Critiques of Gadamer's hermeneutics of dialogue have been many and varied: 
concepts such as community, tradition and prejudices are, for instance, " too 
monolithic, too stable.... to provide a subtle enough basis for understanding the 
complex plays of power and desire in the production and reproduction, the 
representation and interpretation of dialogues" (Crapanzano 1990: 289-90), and the 
philological reasons which motivate this hermeneutics seem in the end to prevail over 
dialogue itself (Crowell 1990:342). While Habermas "criticises Gadamer's tendency to 
convert this historical insight ['Language is only as handed down'] into an 
absolutization of cultural tradition" (Thompson 1981:82 ), Ricoeur argues that "the 
ontology which forms the horizon of hermeneutics is not an independent one, but is 
bound to the methods of interpretation through which it is disclosed" (Thompson 
1981:57). Furthermore, the ontological optimism with which Gadamer legitimates 
truth-claims for his hermeneutics of dialogue, both in text and orality, gives rise to the 
criticisms of Derrida who represents "the opposite movement of an ontological 
scepticism grounded in an explicit claim for the 'textuality' of dialogue" (Crowell 
1990:340). 
     The concern of both Gadamer and Derrida with understanding, meaning and truth, 
and their eagerness to leave the once secure grounds of metaphysics, puts them at the 
forefront of current philosophical discussion (Dallmayr 1989:75-76). Their "improbable 
debate" (cf. Michelfelder-Palmer 1989) presents a challenge to metaphysics as well as to 
other interpretive disciplines, including the social sciences, since both question the 
metaphysical assumption that "language is at our disposal", and both 'hermeneutics and 
deconstruction' typify in different ways 'Socratic vigilance' and anti-foundational thinking 
(Risser 1989: 183-85). Gadamer, wanting to preserve the 'unity of meaning' through the 
'good will' of the participants in a dialogue
, sees language as the living word of 
conversation. For Derrida instead, the spoken word is seen as a 'disrupted sign', and 
reading does not point to dialogue but towards other readings since "the horizon of a text 
is another text", not derived from an extra textual Sache (issue), but from an intertextual 
dissemination of the sign (Crowell 1990: 351). The "good will" of the participants in 
dialogue proposed by Gadamer as a prerequisite for a dialogue to proceed, is attacked by 
Derrida as pre-eminently logo centric since it presupposes "an already existing 
commonality in the conditions of understanding" (Simon 1989: 172) which is beyond the 
power of the will. On this point Dallmayer observes: 
      Gadamer's hermeneutics encourage us to venture forth and seek to comprehend alien 
      cultures and life-worlds; however, the question remains whether, in this venture, cultural 
      differences are not simply assimilated or absorbed into the understanding mind (which is 
      basically a Western mind). On the other hand, by stressing rupture and radical otherness
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Derrida seeks to uproot and dislodge the inquirer's self-identity; yet, his insistence on 
incommensurability and non-understanding tends to encourage reciprocal cultural 
disengagement and hence non-learning (Dallmayr 1989:91-2).
     Crowell, sharing these concerns, sees in the "neglected orality" of dialogue of 
both Gadamer and his critics a reason to propose a return to ethics. According to him, 
Gadamer's focus on the ontological structure of dialogue prevents the latter from seeing 
"the ethically irreducible meaning of the f
ace-to-face dimension of spoken dialogue". 
Thus, "in facing the Other, dialogue is our condition for a mutuality that in its 
asymmetry [as opposed to the 'textualist moment of symmetry'] eludes ontology" 
(Crowell 1990:354). 
     The ethical necessity of dialogue, stressed by some authors or commentators on 
the Gadamer/Derrida encounter, is taken to its furthest limit by Crowell. The Other for 
him is "the one who makes a claim on me prior to the assertion of truth claims.... who 
challenges my self-sufficiency and thus is encountered 'above' me - not as partner but as 
teacher. Such is the ethical (not ontological) asymmetry that distinguishes dialogue 
from the 'rhetorical strategies' that rest on it, and so also from the texts with which it 
may be confused" (Crowell 1990: 354). Crowell is here appealing to Levinas's insights 
and suggests adopting his perspective in anthropology (Crowell 1990:357).
Levinas: 'the Face of the Other'
     To challenge the untenable position of a totalising, knowing subject - for it is 
upon the nature of knowledge that the Self founds its claims to truth - Levinas proposes 
a reflection upon a 'fundamental event', which is prior to all knowledge: the Face of the 
Other. This 'event' "does not have any systematic character. It is a notion through which 
man comes to me via a human act different from knowing" (Levinas 1988:171). The 
face of the Other is not a representation, it is not a given of knowledge, but it is an 
authority, which, paradoxically, originates not from 'force' but, on the contrary, from 
extreme frailty and destitution. It is in its nakedness and vulnerability that the face 
demands and commands: "Thou shalt not kill". This 'unspoken message' precedes every 
a priori condition of cognition and becomes an obligation to the Other, a responsibility. 
With this move, Levinas displaces the first claim of ontology, exemplified in the 
'conatus essendi ' or the effort to exist
, where existence is the supreme law. Thus the 
command 
      ... 'thou shalt not kill' emerges as a limitation of the conatus essendi. It is not a rational limit, 
      but a moral ethical term. It is not force but authority. It is a paradox. Both authority and 
      morality are paradoxes... (Levinas 1988:176).
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     It is the idea of dissymmetry, however, which destabilises the idea of equality 
present in the conatus essendi (perseverance in being) : ....... In the ethical act, in my 
relationship to the other, if one forgets that I am guiltier than the others, justice itself 
will not be able to last" (Ibid.). Equality is put in question by this dissymmetry, since, 
looking at the destitute face of the other, I discover that his life is more important than 
my own, and that "the Other is always closer to God than I" (Blanchot 1986:45). As 
Levinas says of himself: "I am trying to work against the identification of the divine 
with unification or totality. Man's relationship with the other is better as difference than 
as unity: sociality is better than fusion. The very value of love is the impossibility of 
reducing the other to myself, of coinciding into sameness...." (Levinas-Kearney 
1986:22). If missionary activity is challenged by this statement, so is anthropology and 
its critics when they rest their theories on 'knowledge and truth', which are only a 
camouflage to 'kill' the other. For "the ethical 'thou shalt not' dominates the economic 
and political 'I can'. The 'I can' and the philosophies of 'I can' are no less egocentric than 
the philosophies of 'I think', notwithstanding that the ego is correlated with an other" 
(Blanchot 1986:45). 
     If Levinas's thought "can make us tremble", it is also because "the complicity of 
theoretical objectivity and mystical communion will be Levinas's true target" (Derrida 
1978:82/87). Levinas's move to destroy neither God nor the self, but their 
indiscriminate power, leaves him in a position both of fragility and authority. This 
authority, however, "lies equally ... in the absence of power, in the way it calls, 
commands, demands an ethical response" (Wood 1988:2). This "fragile writing", while 
it enters and deploys "the logocentric language of philosophy, which constantly 
threatens his project," is able to disturb the self of Western thought, questioning it about 
its others. For Levinas, God, language, the self, "being, appearance, subjectivity, and 
time are all topics about which disagreement is far from trivial" (Smith 1986:66-7). 
     Repeatedly Levinas reminds us of the "totalitarian tendencies inherent in all of 
Western philosophy - primacy of the ego and the reduction of everything to the same", 
which were also at the root of (Western) missionary theology and activity, characterised 
by the transmission of truths/dogmas, the imposition of new sets of values, and the 
transformation/conversion of the Other. Contrary to this, Levinas proposes not just a 
subject but a responsible subject who welcomes the other, not as a threat to my freedom 
"before which I shrivel" (Sartre)
, but as the one who teaches me to be myself in spite of 
myself. Thus "the awakening to responsibility is an exaltation of singularity, a 
deepening of interiority, a surplus of consciousness...." (De Boer 1986:110). The 
ethnocentric message of missionary enterprise had to come to terms with the 
continuous exposure to the Other, and this Other was to break through the subtle but
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defiant aggressiveness of the missionary. 
     There is undoubtedly a paradox in recent missionary intentions which, first 
setting out to convert, then renounces the raison d'etre of its vocation - a move which 
finds its parallel in Levinas's "Paradox of Morality". Moreover, not only does Levinas 
corroborate the paradox of those missionaries who dispute 'conversion', but he also 
challenges the position of those who advocate 'conversion of the Other' in the name of 
their own God,13 challenging at the same time the Aristotelian and scholastic definitions 
of God (Ipsum Esse Substinence or Ens Causa Sui) which informed mission theology 
and practice. Levinas opposes to this a God who "reveals himself as a trace, not as an 
ontological presence". 14 'To believe' or 'not to believe' belongs to the 'Greek language of 
intelligibility'. It means to prove, to give evidence, to fight for the truth, and through 
this fighting the Other is destroyed. The ethical or biblical perspective transcends this 
language "as a theme of justice and concern for the other as other, as a theme of love 
and desire, which carries us beyond the infinite being of the world as presence....." 
(Levinas-Kearney 1986:20). God, for Levinas, 'is the commandment of Love', and, 
like the face, is beyond being and comprehension. Indeed, some missionaries have 
accepted undergoing a process of "conversion to the Other" or, at least, they present 
'conversion' as a process of "mutual metanoia" in which they include themsel
ves.15 As 
in Levinas's ethical conversion, entailing a kenosis, a haemorrhage of the self, and a 
"turning of our nature inside out"
, missionary self-conversion is never complete, since 
it does not take place in the region of consciousness, unconsciousness or being, but "is 
an emptying of my consciousness, a kenosis commanded by the ethical word of the 
other which inflicts a wound that never heals" (Llewelyn 1988:144; cf. Levinas 
1969:197; Levinas 1981:126). As a result, some missionaries have realised that "the 
enemy of the Christian poor is not the humble Muslim, but the one who is above them 
both and can abuse religious power to suppress every attempt to denounce facts and 
suffocate every desire for liberation" (Rigali 1990:9). This commitment to alterity is 
very close to a Levinasian understanding of 'justice'16 and the need to "deploy the 
language of metaphysics" in order to obtain justice (Levinas-Kearney 1986:28). 
     Our case study, the Rishi-missionary dialogue, far from being a straightforward 
example, reveals many complexities and ambiguities, given the multiplicity of parallel 
dialogues in which it is embedded. The advantage the case offers is that it depicts the 
extreme position of a Western Self in its quest to define, dominate and absorb the Other. 
However, while this has been the main thrust of a powerful Self, born from a cogent 
Logos, a weaker Self was giving space to a different approach to the Other. A close 
look at the history of the mission shows that dialogue was not always the first choice 
and, when it occurred, it was often troubled and uncertain, involving risk-taking rather
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than immediate achievements. Despite this, in some cases, the Other has awakened the 
Self to responsibility and, as Levinas puts it, has motivated its 'subjected subjectivity' as 
an ethical response, prior to the metaphysical urge for a 'will to power'. 
     In a recent study on Christian missions among the Tswana of South Africa, as 
part of a two volume enterprise, Jean and John Comaroff (1991) aim at presenting "the 
colonization of consciousness", by means of which a small number of Nonconformist 
missionaries tried to subordinate a large number of people. In their analysis the 
Comaroffs rely mainly on Gramsci but arrive at conclusions diametrically different 
from mine. Wanting to write an 'historical anthropology of colonialism', the authors, 
despite their claim to re-vindicate the 'real internal dynamism or agency' of the locals, 
seem to pay more attention to missionary representatives, since "we are told very little 
indeed concerning the lives, thoughts and motives of the first generations of Tswana 
converts" (Gray 1993:197). If this reflects, as every researcher into the history of 
missions has experienced, the nature of the sources available, it does not excuse the 
authors from reducing the Tswana to "recalcitrant objects of their [missionaries'] 
endeavours" (Peel 1992:328). In fact, in the 'long conversation' between missionaries 
and Tswana (chap. 6), the latter appear as "a fairly unindividualised mass". 
      Most surprising of all is the wholesale neglect of African evangelists, catechists, teachers, 
      church elders etc. - a body of people whom evidence from elsewhere in Africa suggests 
      played the crucial mediating role in religious change (Peel 1992:329). 
     Further evidence from south India clearly shows how Christian converts to 
Protestantism "were by no means the passive recipients of evangelism, but, rather, 
active agents in assessing and acting upon missionary attempts at proselytization" 
(Caplan 1987:43). 
     This omission is even more surprising if we consider that the Comaroffs rely on 
Gramsci's theory of hegemony to "propose a notion of culture as process" (Schoffeleers 
1993:86). Although hegemony is an open concept in Gramscian writings - and thus 
incorporates religious hegemony - the authors do not seem to see its relevance, given 
that they "virtually ignore the religious dimension" (Gray 1993:197), and that they "... 
evade the difficult, but cardinal, issue of just what sense the Tswana did make of 
religious teachings they received from the missions" (Peel 1992: 329). A more coherent 
Gramscian approach would have helped them to make more sense of the fact that the 
evangelists "....sought to recruit a free citizenry .... but filled their pews with serfs and 
clients" (Jean & John Comaroff 1991:261). We will return to discuss the implications of 
Gramsci's political thought within the more general framework of a Levinasian and 
Derridian 'politics of ethical difference'. 
     My attempt to compare the 'crisis' of anthropology with the 'crisis' of mission
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has been motivated by the common ground shared by these two enterprises, given that 
both rest on Western metaphysics, which represents the epitome of the absorption of the 
Other by the Same. It is not by advocating the end of mission activity or the end of 
anthropology that the Western Self will cease exercising its power over the Other. On 
the contrary, the alternative to the recurrent mood of negativity is to promote a different 
approach to both mission and anthropology. Even the solution of renouncing 'the 
talismanic properties of Otherness,' is partial and in need of a more radical discourse 
and for this reason I have suggested following a Levinasian reading of alterity, whereby 
the Same becomes a responsible and ethical self subjected to the Other. 
     The difficulty we are faced with is both terminological and methodological. For 
instance: when Levinas uses the word 'ethics', is he not returning to the metaphysical 
tradition of a totalising self he wishes to abandon? What is the difference between 
Levinasian ethics and 'Christian ethics', as applied by the missionary, or professional 
ethics as observed by the anthropologist? (cf. Fluehr-Lobban 1991). I attempt to 
address these questions by following Critchley's suggestion of reading Levinas through 
Derridian deconstruction.
Derrida: Clotural Reading and the 'Politics of Ethical Difference' 
     Since "deconstruction is a double reading that operates within a double bind of 
both belonging to a tradition, a language, and a philosophical discourse, while at the 
same time being incapable of belonging to the latter.....", Critchley proposes, through 
clotural reading, to introduce a moment of alterity contained in deconstruction: 
      Following both Levinas's account of the history of Western philosophy in terms of the 
      primacy of an ontology which seeks to enclose all phenomena within the closure of 
      comprehension and reduce plurality to unity and his critique of the ontological concept of 
      history, which is always the history of the victors, never of the victims... against which 
      Levinas speaks in tones very similar to those of Walter Benjamin when the latter opposes 
      historical materialism to objectivist history, it will be argued that the notion of clotural 
      reading allows the question of ethics to be raised within deconstruction. Clotural reading is 
      history read from the standpoint of the victims of that history. It is, in a complex sense, 
     ethical history (Critchley 1992:30). 
     This allows us not only to approach Levinasian ethics from a different 
perspective, but also to move to the centre of our study those others, the Rishi, who are 
the 'victims' in this case. It is, in fact, in trying to respect their alterity that it becomes 
problematic for us to use a logocentric, totalising language which nullifies alterity 
while trying to convey a message that wishes to obtain the opposite result. For this very 
reason, my 'thinking' the Rishi and my writing about them are called into question, for I
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too use this language as I try to prove that Levinasian ethics precedes my thinking and 
writing. 
     Derrida's reading of the efforts made in Husserlian phenomenology to overcome 
Heideggerian metaphysical closure, is seen by Critchley "as a transgression of the 
metaphysical tradition and as a restoration of that tradition", which "contains within 
itself the trace or 'the scar' of an irreducible alterity" (Critchley 1992:75). It is in the 
suspension of choice - or 'undecidability'- between the metaphysical and the non-
metaphysical, "a suspension provoked in, as, and through a practice of clotural reading" 
- Critchley claims - "that the ethical dimension of deconstruction is opened and 
maintained...." (Ibid.: 192). Undecidability, however, presents a limitation in addressing 
the question of politics, as Critchley shows in analysing the works of Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy, who maintain that Heideggerian completion of philosophy results in 
political totalitarianism including also Western democratic liberalism, since, according 
to them, "there is nothing democratic about the liberal state" (Ibid.:211). 
     In order both to answer the question regarding the possibility of politics that 
does not reduce transcendence and alterity, and to overcome 'the impasse of the 
political in Derrida's work', Critchley turns to Levinasian ethics to disrupt every form of 
political totalitarianism (e.g. National Socialism) and immanentism, including Western 
liberal democracy (Ibid.:220). 
     With the move to the 'third party' - from ethics to politics - Levinas recognises a 
double community, "both equal and unequal, symmetrical and asymmetrical, political 
and ethical", which he names 'monotheism', "linking together the question of God and 
the question of the community". However, as we have already stated earlier, the 
Levinasian God,'7 being only a trace in the face of the Other,'8 presents itself as 
different from the God of onto-theo-logy. 
     This new conception of the organisation of political space, far from representing 
a-politicism and quietism, disrupts the logic of Heideggerian fundamental ontology for 
which "to die for the Other is always secondary" (ibid.:225). For Levinas, instead, 
'politics begins as ethics
, that is, as the possibility of sacrifice' which interrupts 'all 
attempts at totalization, totalitarianism, or immanentism' (ibid.). In other words, the 
closure of ontology already contains a break through which the 'trace' makes itself 
present, given that the Same is such because of the Other, the centre is centre because 
of periphery, and the Said is Said because it is preceded by the Saying. Whilst the Said 
(le dit) represents the power of ontology, the appropriation of time, the occupation of 
space "in which objectification, universalization, representation, consciousness, 
experience, phenomenality, givenness, and presence orient and ... dominate its thought" 
(Peperzak 1993:36), the Saying (le dire) is the primordial moment that generated our
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Said and remains as a trace that cannot be remembered. This Saying, however, is not 
completely lost and, in its anachronism, returns as a 'surprise' to 'unsay' (dedire) what 
we have said. 
     There appears to be a clear relation between the Said of anthropology and the 
ontology of a totalizing self ready to authorise others. There is also a movement from 
the Said to the Saying of anthropology, with a difference in which the Saying is prior to 
theories and enquiries, academic requirements and positions of power within the 
discipline. Although a return to the Said is inevitable when writing about the Other - in 
ethnography - this new Said could represent a differance from the first one, if the 
encounter with and proximity of the Other is not forgotten, but awakens responsibility. 
From this point of view, the Other is able to open anthropology to the third party, le 
tiers in Levinasian sense, since in the face of the Other I see the suffering of others. The 
passage from ethics to politics in anthropology is complicated and problematic, as it is 
in Levinas's discourse, but nevertheless, necessary, if we do not want to run the risk of 
fostering a discipline which promotes a-political quietism and keeps 'a murderous 
silence in front of the dying face of the Other'. 
     I turn now to discuss some political implications of Gramsci's thought, both in 
its specific application of ethical politics and in support of my line of enquiry. If 
Gramsci's thought is closer to an 'immanent' reading of world history, his emphasis on 
personal commitment and responsibility for others, takes him closer to a Derridian and 
Levinasian ethical politics.
Gramsci: the'Vision
' of New Ethical Politics
     It has been suggested that Gramsci's "fragmentary, multiple, incisive and spiral 
writing" is close to Derrida's deconstruction: "Crossing as he does different levels of 
language (philosophy, journalism, politics), mingling them in a work without end, 
Gramsci the writer already transgresses the traditional divisions, the ideologies of 
closed knowledge, a certain type of division of intellectual labour...." (Buci-
Glucksmannnn 1980:9). It is difficult in this sense to successfully use one particular 
Gramscian theory without taking into account the magnitude of his incomplete and 
fragmented science of political practice. Gramsci's philosophical project, calling into 
question the status of philosophy, was meant to establish "a new relation between 
philosophy, culture and politics" (ibid.: 10). In this sense, 'he never posed abstract 
problems that were separate and divorced from everyday life' (Lisa 1973:77, quoted in 
Buci-Glucksmannn 1980:3), since he worked towards the transformation of reality 
through "the attainment of higher awareness, with the aid of which one succeeds in
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understanding one's own historical value, one's own function in life, one's own rights 
and obligations" (Gramsci 1977:11). 
     The connection established by Gramsci between politics and culture enabled 
him, despite his segregation in a state prison, to become a philosopher of the masses. 
The crisis generated in Italy by a totalitarian apparatus and widespread poverty were for 
Gramsci more important than his misfortunes, and this struggle for freedom became a 
defiance of the fascists who sought 'to stop that brain from functioning'. As Germino 
(1990:13) puts it: "For Antonio Gramsci politics is the process of including people who 
had been excluded and of merging the periphery with the centre". His own experience 
as a hunchback and a Sardinian played an important role in developing 'a theory of 
politics based on including the excluded' (ibid.: 12), but instead of feeling pity for 
himself and for the Sardinian people,19 he rejected "closure in favour of openness and 
'broadening out' " (ibid.). Since for Gramsci "the search for the Leitmotiv, for the 
rhythm of the thought as it develops, should be more important than that for single 
casual affirmations and isolated aphorisms" (Gramsci 1971: 383), it can be established 
that the leitmotif holding the parts of the Prison Notebooks together "is a vision of a 
new politics oriented towards the emarginati [marginalized] rather than towards the 
prestigious and the powerful. Nothing in the notebooks is irrelevant to this vision, 
because 'everything is political' " (Germino 1990: 253). The use of architectural 
metaphors, employed to emphasise 'the arrangement of space to accommodate the 
social body', gave him the opportunity to compare himself to an architect who, although 
prevented from building anything materially (given his imprisonment), can still work on 
designs. The immateriality of the metaphor is extended to his role as a political 
architect who "deals with the impalpable relationships that lie hidden in material things. 
His space is more elusive and does not respond to fixed designs" (Ibid.). In this sense, 
Gramscian politics "indicate a new social space in which the distinction between 
leaders and led has been 'attenuated.... to the point of disappearance' " (Ibid.: 254). 
     Although it may seem that we have come a long way from Derridian 
deconstruction of metaphysics and Levinasian understanding of ethical politics, in my 
view Gramsci represents a moment of serious reflection towards a politics where the 
near Other was to play an important role in opening towards le tiers, the third party, or 
'the others' of political commitment. His 'new politics of inclusion' of marginalized 
people in society could not be implemented through charitable philanthropy alone: 
"...Gramsci makes clear that the new politics can come about only through an 
intellectual and moral metanoia, or transformation, of consciousness", but aware that 
the dominant sector would make only partial concessions, he maintained that "the 
initiative for such a transformation must come from the depressed strata themselves"
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(Germino 1990:260). At the same time, he asks the intellectuals to transform 
themselves by abandoning their 'caste' and becoming 'organic leaders' for those at the 
periphery. If Gramsci's atheism puts him in 'opposition' to Levinas's theism, his 
transcendence of 'petrified religiousness' and of 'reductionist materialist positivism' 
brings the two together in a common commitment to the Other. 
      The Notebooks record the action of a mind determined to continue the struggle for a new, 
      inclusive politics, a struggle begun three decades before in Sardinia. Gramsci had 
      empathized with the retarded boy chained in a hovel in the vacant countryside, with the 
      workers in the mines who had to boil roots for nourishment, and with shepherds who could 
      not afford to buy shoes... (Germino 1990: 222). 
     If I have followed this trajectory of presentation, moving from the Rishi-
missionary dialogue, through the Derrida-Levinas encounter, searching for a viable 
ethical politics to a Gramscian new politics of inclusion, it is because, by following 
Gramsci, I wish to make "an inventory of the traces deposited by the historical process" 
that brought me to be who I am. I did not plan to refer to a theory of alterity before 
starting my reflection on the Rishi-missionary encounter, and in a way I had not 
planned to re-read Gramsci's writings. Gramsci's experience and my own have been 
quite different, since I found myself for a long time committed to a 'religious cause', but 
the starting point and the final destination are the same. 
     If anthropology has the power to discuss and unmask the power of other 
institutions, this can be done by making concrete choices and placing the Other in a 
privileged position whereby the discipline cannot escape its own responsibility, even 
when judging the power of others. Aware of its own power, anthropology has also 
become aware of its weaknesses and limitations, so that no dogmas can be imposed in 
the name of 'truths' to be defended. This 'finitude', far from representing the end of a 
discipline, allows it to 'learn through suffering' by sharing the suffering of others. 
     To conclude this reflection, I return to the starting-point, the Rishi-missionary 
encounter. The Rishi are 'Untouchables' who aspire either to be part of Hindu society, 
or seek refuge by converting to Christianity. In terms of Critchley's 'clotural reading' of 
a Derridian understanding of metaphysical closure, we can say that the Rishis' 
experience is a moment of 'transgression and restoration, belonging and not-belonging, 
break and continuation' of a tradition, revealing an alterity that cannot be reduced and 
that, at the same time, places them 'on the limit' of a text written by others and 
deconstructed by the Rishi. If the liminality is for them ambiguity, it is also a way out 
beyond the closure, since they tenaciously preserve a 'trace' of alterity not contained in 
the closure. Again, in terms of the Levinasian 'Saying and Said', we can suggest that 
they will need to return to the language of Greek philosophy, or the Said of their
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tradition, and only after the Said has being unSaid by their Saying, will it make a 
difference. 
     However, the answer to my many questions is not to be found in a 'unifying 
concept', which would go against dialogue itself, but in the capability of an 
'anthropological project' which
, in the style of Derridian democracy, is a project that 
does not exist, in the sense that, starting from today, there is a responsibility - encore un 
effort - to invent it, peutetre a 'project' a venir, characterised by incompleteness and 
deferral. 
     The Rishi, for their part, though 'losers' in current socio-economic and political 
terms, demonstrate an aptitude to be effective partners in dialogue. They have neither 
place nor voice, but their plea grows louder in their search for humanity (We too are 
Humans! Amrao je manus!). The very stubbornness of their quest is an example for 
both the missionary and the anthropologist who, like the Rishi, are currently re-
negotiating their identity. Thus, the enquiring self, even when dictating the conditions 
of its own ethical rules and the commitment of its own political choices, is constantly 
displaced and is asked to learn from those who cannot afford and/or are not permitted 
to be ethical or political. For even Christianity, though recurrently misused by those in 
power, is constantly challenged by those at the periphery and remains the history of 
'lesser people'.
Conclusion
     The advantage of applying an ethical-dialogic interpretation, both as a 
theoretical orientation and as a methodological 'tool', is that the writer can never, no 
matter how much he/she wishes, have the final 'concluding' word. A discourse on 
ethical dialogue can never be 'concluded,' for it must remain attentive to new voices that 
can intervene to carry on the dialogue. Even our case study, though localised in space 
and time, is still part of a more general idea of cross-cultural dialogue and indeed it 
represents a concrete occurrence of the latter and, as such, is destined to continue, in 
whatever manner. 
     At the level of reflection, there are some authors worth mentioning, though 
briefly, since their work obliges my own writing to continue the conversation and 
remain open to future dialogues. A recent work by H. H. Kogler (1996) indicates that 
interest in this topic is very much alive. Bringing Gadamer and Foucault together, 
Kogler shows that there is a sensible middle ground in debates about the effectiveness 
of critical resistance to social patterns of domination. On the same line of thought, 
Falzon (1998), offering a different reading of Foucault's work, challenges both
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postmodern fragmentation and Habermasian 'communicative intersubjectivity', and 
affirms that "a genuine dialogue with the other implies not simply the appearance of 
new, different, other voices, but also that these voices are able to have real effect in the 
culture ... So understood, dialogue is a 'dangerous perhaps', an open, risky, 
endeavour...... (Falzon 1998:98).
Notes
1 Cf. Amaladoss 1990; Swidler et al. 1990. 
2 Cf. Dwyer 1977; 1979; 1982; Tedlock 1979; 1983; Fabian 1983; 1990; Maranhao ed. 1990; 
      McGrane 1989. 
3 During the Renaissance "... the fundamental European response to this alien Other lies in the 
      massive and ceaseless task of conversion..." (McGrane 1989:13-14); the other is seen "as a 
      potential Christian.... Only after Christianity comes Anthropology...." (ibid.: 18). 
4 "Those leading the post-modem genre appear relatively indifferent to the material circumstances 
      surrounding their own intellectual production. They have little to say about their locus in the 
      United States and the relation of their academic movement to the country's global economic 
      and political hegemony" (Peace 1990:28). 
5 One copy has been kept at the Biblioteca Publica de Evora, Ms. C XVI / 1-1 Peca 11. 
6 "They call this language 'Portuguez torto,' but the Christians of Bengal take much pride in it, so 
      that they would consider it an outrage, were they obliged to learn the catechism-in Bengali. 
      They also consider it a great shame to be called Bengali, even though they are such, for they 
      say that only the pagans are Bengalis, and they Portuguese, though yellow or black ones... 
      From this stems their repugnance to be catechized in Bengali" (Hartmann 1978:196). 
7 See Hobart 1996. 
8 See Vicente Rafael (1987) who makes a clear connection between conquest, translation and 
      conversion in the Spanish language, as this was used to Christianize the Tagalog and the 
      way the Tagalog 'changed the meaning of Christian missionary discourse.' 
9 Among them should be mentioned Crapanzano (1980), Dwyer (1982), Tedlock (1983), Basso 
     (1984), Bruner and Gorfain (1984), Rabinow (1977, 1986), Taussig (1987), Maranhao ed. 
     (1990), Tedlock and Mannheim (1995) and Mayerfeld Bell and Gardiner eds. (1998). 
10 On this score, Mumford suggests abandoning Weber's model of western prophetic thinkers who 
      promoted rationalization and science, in favor of Joseph Needham's model of eastern 
      intercasuality. 
11 One set of myths of origin collected in the area (see Zene 1994, Appendix 2a) reflects the frame 
      of mind whereby the Rishi are responsible for their own situation. In summary, one of the 
      Rishi Muni, the compilers of the Sacred Vedas, while performing sacrifice stole some meat 
      from the cow and as a consequence he and his offspring were 'condemned' to work as 
      Muchi, skinners, and leatherworkers. Another set of myths are widespread among the Rishi 
      of south-west Bangladesh (see Zene 1994, Appendix 2b), and are constructed around the 
      figure of Ruidas and commonly found in the Bakta Mala and the Bhagvana Ravidasa. "The 
      Rai Dasis are a Vaisnava sect of N. India, founded by Rai (or Ravi) Das, one of the twelve 
      chief disciples of Ramananda. Its members are low caste Chamars, or leather-workers, and,
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      in fact, Chamars, as a caste, often call themselves, Rai Dasis ... Rai Dasa's home was at 
      Benares, and, as a disciple of Ramananda, he probably flourished in the earlier part of the 
      15th century A.D. He was a fellow-disciple with Kabir, with whose teachings his doctrine 
      regarding the uselessness of the Vedas and Brahmanical Hinduism had much in common" 
     (Grierson 1955:560). 
12 "...[T]he attribution of implicit meanings to an alien practice regardless of whether they are 
      acknowledged by its agents is a characteristic form of theological exercise, with an ancient 
     history" (Asad 1986:161). 
13 " The word of God speaks through the glory of the face and calls for an ethical conversion, or 
       reversal of our nature........ In this respect, we could say that God is the other who turns 
      our nature inside out, who calls our ontological will-to-be [conatus essendi ] into question. .       
. God does indeed go against nature, for He is not of this world. God is other than being" 
      (Levinas-Kearney 1986:25, emphasis added). 
14 "The God of ethical philosophy is not God the almighty being of creation, but the persecuted God 
      of the prophets [the Suffering Servant] who is always in relation with man and whose 
      difference from man is never indifference" (Levinas-Kearney 1986:32).
15 "When a missionary fails to transform himself in relation to the transformation of the other, 
      communication evaporates and there is merely an exchange of words..." (Burridge 1978:20). 
16 "Justice is the way in which I respond to the face that I am not alone in the world with the other.... 
      Justice is not the last word... we seek a better justice... there is a violence in justice... there is 
      a place for charity after justice" (Levinas 1988:174-5). 
17 "The God of Levinas is not the God of onto-theo-logy, but rather.... God 'is' an empty place, the 
      anarchy of an absence at the heart of the community" (Critchley 1992:228). 
18 "... The passage to le tiers, to justice and humanity as a whole, is also a passage to the prophetic 
      word, the commonness of the divine father in a community of brothers...." (Ibid.:227-8). 
19 Being particularly sensitive to theories of Sardinians "as biologically inferior to the Italians on the 
      mainland", for Gramsci "Sardinia was the laboratory in which the injustice of the larger 
      world could be measured". This notion of 'laboratory' can be supported by the fact that 
      although Sardinia was seen as oppressed by the mainland, its own social order reflected the 
      same pattern "of oppression by the powerful over the weak" (Germino 1990:11). Gramsci, 
      however, did not try to solve Sardinia's problems in a 'tribal direction' but sought "to 
      transcend immediate, unhealthy narcissistic concern for self and to empathise with the 
      'prestigeless' whoever and wherever they were" (Ibid.: 13).
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